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In 1989, as France celebrates the bicentenary of the Ftench Revolution,
much will be heard of the revolution's ideals-Liberte, egalite, fraternite
(Liberty, equality, fraternity). Yet on the other side of the world, in the
South Pacific, France's critics will be tempted to point to the gap between
these ideals and the realities of the French presence. The French Pacific
territories have democratic institutions, but France has not always cham-
pioned liberty in the region. In Vanuatu in the 1970s, local French officials
obstructed the nationalist campaign for unity and independence. In New
Caledonia, France has been confronted by the demands of the Kanak
nationalist movement, representing the minority Kanak community, for
its version of national liberty. The conflict has involved two bouts of
unrest, in 1984-1985 and early 1988, which left more than fifty dead and
brought the territory to the brink of civil war. Instead of promoting social
equality, France has produced sharp inequalities in both New Caledonia
and French Polynesia. And rather than promoting fraternity, French poli-
cies in New Caledonia, and nuclear testing in French Polynesia, have
sparked strong opposition. For example, Fiji's representative told the
General Assembly of the United Nations in October 1988 that France
"must heed the collective and growing opposition of the peoples of the
South Pacific to its continued nuclear testing and cease all future testing"
(FT, 17 Oct 1988). In late 1985 the governments of the region condemned
France when they learned that French secret agents had been responsible
for the bombing in Auckland Harbour (which killed one crew member) of
the Rainbow Warrior, the Greenpeace vessel that had been about to sail to
Moruroa Atoll to protest the tests.
Against this background, France's relations with most of the countries
of the South Pacific were difficult during the early and mid-1980s, espe-
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cially while the government of Jacques Chirac held office, from March
1986 to May 1988. More recently, the style, policies, and image of France
in the region have been modified following the coming to power in June
1988 of a socialist government under Michel Rocard. Two handshakes
symbolize the changes. In late June 1988, the leader of the pro-indepen-
dence Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS, National
Kanak Socialist Liberation Front) in New Caledonia, Jean-Marie Tjibaou,
clasped hands with his bitter opponent, Jacques Lafleur, president of the
loyalist pro-France Rassemblement Pour la Caledonie dans la Republique
(RPCR, Rally for Caledonia in the Republic). After the unrest and deaths
of early 1988, this marked the signing of an accord, negotiated by Prime
Minister Rocard, that permitted New Caledonia's return to an uneasy
peace. The second handshake took place in late August 1988, during a fly-
ing visit by Rocard to New Caledonia. Pausing along a reception line,
Rocard studiously injected warmth into his meeting with David O'Leary,
the Australian consul-general in Noumea. This signaled a new cordiality
in French relations with Australia, the "giant" among the member coun-
tries of the South Pacific Forum, and with other countries of the region
(Australian, 22 Aug 1988; Age, 27 Aug 1988; see also Richardson 1988).
This apparent transformation should be kept in perspective. The new
French government is more moderate and constructive in its Pacific poli-
cies, and more temperate in its language, than its combative, rightwing
predecessor. Yet French policy in the region has displayed strong conti-
nuities, despite variations in style of government or in policy emphasis.
French governments have remained committed to regular nuclear testing
in French Polynesia for an indefinite period. They have varied in their
handling of New Caledonia, but all have sought to take account of settler
interests and to ensure that French influence endures. They have consist-
ently sought to uphold France's strategic, political, cultural, and economic
presence in the region.
France regards as vital its overseas possessions, its independent nuclear
deterrent, and its strong leverage in most of its former colonies, especially
francophone Africa (Chipman 1985; Bernstein 1987). The French view is
that these attributes ensure France's international prestige and influence;
without them France would slip to the rank of middle power, consistent
with its size and relatively modest economic strength. France's widely
scattered South Pacific territories-New Caledonia, French Polynesia,
and Wallis and Futuna-number three among its eleven overseas posses-
sions, located in the North Atlantic, the West Indies, South America, the
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Indian Ocean, and the Antarctic, as well as the Pacific. 1 In the South
Pacific, global concerns, and especially France's commitment to an inde-
pendent nuclear deterrent, do much to shape French policy. Within this
broad framework, the territories and the other aspects of the French
Pacific presence are of considerable significance to France. The three terri-
tories have a combined total population of less than 350,000 but cost the
French taxpayer more than A$1450 million a year (Table I). France is
likely to invest further and to act firmly to protect its South Pacific pres-
ence, in the belief that the region has increasing importance. 2
The French presence has important implications for regional stability
and interregional relations. Many regional observers regard France as pri-
marily a European power. They have been skeptical about whether a con-
tinuing French presence in the South Pacific is justified, since the other
European powers (and the formerly British settler colonies of Australia
and New Zealand) have relinquished their possessions there. They have
argued that French policies, for example during the decolonization of
Vanuatu and on nuclear testing and New Caledonia, have contributed to
instability. France would prefer to subordinate local pressures in its Pacific
territories to its global interests and aims. However, as recent develop-
ments in New Caledonia demonstrate, these pressures, strengthened to a
modest extent by regional influences, have their own logic and momen-
tum, which make it necessary for France to take them into account.
In this paper I review circumstances in late 1988 in the three French
Pacific territories, discuss the nuclear testing program, examine France's
relations with the region, and discuss prospects into the early 1990S. How
far has the moderate, constructive approach of the Rocard government
reduced the concerns of the South Pacific governments, especially by con-
tributing to a resolution in New Caledonia? What are the probable varia-
tions in the manner and intensity with which concerns will be expressed,
especially as a result of a more active French diplomacy in Fiji and else-
where in the central South Pacific? And are the broad continuities in
French interests and policies likely to outweigh the new style and emphasis
of the Rocard government?
NEW CALEDONIA: AN UNEASY PEACE
In a whirlwind visit to New Caledonia in late August 1988, Prime Minister
Rocard concluded an agreement between France, the FLNKS, and its loyal-
ist anti-independence opponents, based on the Matignon Accord of late




Land area Sea area French Australian percent of
Territory Population (sq km) (sqkm) francs dollarsl us dollarsl total
New Caledonia 160,000 19,000 1,740,000 2,351.2 470.0 375 13.4
French Polynesia 170,000 4,000 5,030,000 4,797.0 959.4 770 60.0
Wallis & Futuna 13,500 124 300,000 120.0 24.0 19
TOTAL 7,268.0 1,453.4 1,160
Source: AssembIee Nationale 1987a, 39,48,62.
~-Figureson spending are for total direct spending by French government departments; additional funds and benefits flow indi-
rectly to the territories. Figures are rounded to the nearest 100,000 francs. In September 1988 A$1 was equal to approximately 5
French francs.
l Approximate equivalents.
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June. The agreement provides for a referendum in ten years, the division
of the territory into three provinces, and a massive injection of develop-
ment funds to reduce the disadvantages of the Kanak (Melanesian) com-
munity. A final consensus had been hard to reach (Carton 1988), the main
obstacles being FLNKS demands for further concessions and bitter discord
within the FLNKS about whether the nationalist movement should compro-
mise with France. Meanwhile, the RPCR resisted any amendments to the
Matignon Accord. The key demand of the FLNKS was that in the referen-
dum planned for 1998 only those born in the territory should vote. This
would all but guarantee the pro-independence result favored by the Kanak
community by disenfranchising French metropolitan, Polynesian, and
other immigrants, almost all of whom oppose independence (Tjibaou
1988). Because of loyalist pressure, French domestic political consider-
ations, constitutional obstacles, and questions of democratic principle,
the French government would not countenance this change. The govern-
ment insisted on the Matignon formula, which restricted the referendum
franchise to those already resident in the territory in November 1988,
when a French national referendum would endorse the settlement. To
reassure the FLNKS that it is implementing a program of decolonization,
the French government has offered additional concessions and guarantees,
which seek to ensure a much greater participation by Kanaks in the
administration and the modern economic sector. They are also designed
to encourage the departure before 1998 of those non-Kanaks who are
merely seeking a life in the sun, rather than being committed to the future
of New Caledonia. The government is considering increasing income
taxes, shifting the administrative capital from Noumea to the interior, and
reducing retirement benefits for former metropolitan French who retire in
New Caledonia (Fraser 1988; Walls 1988a).
The settlement has been criticized by hard-liners on both sides in New
Caledonia (Uregei 1988; George 1988; SMH, 18 July, 12 Sept 1988). How-
ever, FLNKS President Jean-Marie Tjibaou said in late July that despite
many difficulties, he believed that the "objective conditions" in the terri-
tory were working in the direction of a peaceful resolution. Neither side
wanted a return to the bloodshed and chaos of earlier in the year, and the
leadership of both sides believed that the proposals of the French govern-
ment offered them opportunities. The first big test for Rocard's approach
came with the referendum on the Matignon Accord on 6 November 1988.
Overall, 80 percent of participating voters in metropolitan France and its
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overseas possessions voted yes in support of the plan, compared with 57
percent in New Caledonia. Participation rates were disappointing: only 37
percent of the overall electorate, and only 63 percent in New Caledonia,
turned out at the polls, compared with the normal national and territorial
turnout of around 80 percent. The turnout was fair to good in the Kanak
majority areas, with overwhelming yes votes. However, in the southern
electoral division, including Noumea and nearby municipalities, where
most of the population is loyalist, the vote against was 60.8 percent, with
a turnout of 65.3 percent (Nouvelles, 7 Nov 1988).
Assuming that France fulfills its pledges, the mainstream of the FLNKS is
confident that the Rocard plan offers an opportunity to build a consensus
in favor of independence over the next few years. In order for the indepen-
dence movement to increase its credibility and take advantage of the
opportunity, Tjibaou and his colleagues plan to reorganize the unwieldy
FLNKS coalition. They will seek to reduce the influence of the coalition's
ultramilitant, radical fringe, while increasing that of Tjibaou's Union
Caledonienne, the largest and most moderate of the groups that make up
the FLNKS. The FLNKS will work toward a much greater integration of
Kanaks into the economic and administrative mainstream, a reduction of
the problem of unemployment and delinquency among young Kanaks,
and a demonstration to non-Kanaks that it is possible for the various com-
munities to work together, in the hope of bringing a change of viewpoint
among some of the loyalists.
On the face of it, the nationalist movement risks defeat in the 1998 ref-
erendum. The movement's shift to violent protest in the late 1980s
expressed its frustration at not being able to gain independence through
the ballot box. At present Kanaks constitute only about 45 percent of the
population, and only some 40 percent of the electorate because of non-
registration and a high proportion of their population below voting age.
In addition, around 20 percent of Kanaks have so far opposed indepen-
dence, and support for independence in the other communities has been
negligible. Despite these obstacles, FLNKS analysts expect that the FLNKS
will have an even chance in the 1998 referendum, given the exclusion from
the vote of post-1988 immigrants. They have identified a longer-term
trend for some non-Kanaks to emigrate from New Caledonia each year in
search of better economic prospects elsewhere. The numbers are small,
but they believe that the cumulative total after a decade will be significant.
They also expect other loyalists unable or unwilling to adjust to changing
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circumstances to depart, and hope for a change in view by some non-
Kanaks, especially in the small Asian communities (Tjibaou 1988; Fraser
1988; UC 1988). They were encouraged by the voting patterns in the
November referendum: of those who took part, most European loyalists
voted no, while most loyalists from the other communities voted yes
(SMH, 12 Nov 1988, 34).
For its part, the leadership of the RPCR is confident that account will be
taken of loyalist interests, and accordingly has been ready to compromise,
although it is clear from the results of the November 1988 referendum that
many rank-and-file loyalists have strong reservations about the plan. The
leaders of the party regard the centrist Rocard government as fairer and
more neutral than the socialist government that sought to initiate reforms
from 1981 to 1986 (Martin 1988). Most loyalists have grudgingly con-
cluded that they need to take some account of the demands of the FLNKS
and to remedy the disadvantages of the Melanesian community. The vio-
lence and unrest of early 1988 showed that the Chirac government had
failed in its attempt to smash the nationalist movement. The FLNKS lacks
the capacity to win a decisive victory in a colonial war against France
(Walls 1988b), but it can create extensive disruption, upsetting the econ-
omy, discouraging investment, and making everyday life tense and diffi-
cult. In the longer term, it could raise to an unacceptable level the finan-
cial, political, and other costs of hanging on (Houbert 1985). Meanwhile,
the intensity of repressive measures against Kanak militance is limited by
French domestic and international opinion. Within New Caledonia, a
particular constraint on repression consists of the attitudes of the loyalist
minority of Melanesians, a group vital to the loyalists' argument that their
cause has multiracial legitimacy. In late May 1988, Melanesian loyalist
leaders told their white RPCR colleagues that their continuing adherence to
the loyalist cause was questionable in view of Chirac's Rambo-style han-
dling of the Ouvea affair. They complained trenchantly that the rescue of
the hostages held by FLNKS militants in a cave on Ouvea was cynically
timed in an effort to gain electoral advantage in the second round of the
French presidential elections, and that the heavy casualty toll might have
been avoided had negotiations continued. Their bitterness intensified
when official investigations confirmed that some of the Kanak dead had
been killed after surrendering.
The RPCR leadership believes that the settlement based on the Ma-
tignon Accord offers the loyalists a chance to consolidate their position,
, ,
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not least because, with the territory divided into three jurisdictions, they
will control the rich southern province, including the main urban center-
Noumea and its suburbs-where most of the non-Kanaks live. Many
RPCR supporters are dismissive of the Kanaks' distinctive culture and iden-
tity, and believe that in due course the independence movement will frag-
ment. They believe that if the Kanaks are integrated into the administra-
tive and economic mainstream, then most of them will become more
conservative and pro-French, and less assertive of their identity. The result
would be either that most Kanaks will vote against independence in the
I998 referendum, or, although less likely, that a conservative form of inde-
pendence, acceptable to the non-Kanaks, would be negotiated (Maresca
I988; Fraser I988; FEER, 30 June I988).
The French government is content to keep its options open while seek-
ing to retain the confidence of both sides. Rocard's appointee as govern-
ment envoy and high commissioner, Bernard Grasset, who arrived in July
I988, is a man open to dialogue and keen to arbitrate fairly between the
rival blocs (Grasset I988). In France, New Caledonia attracts only spo-
radic attention, and many other issues rank higher on the political agenda.
The disturbances in April, May, and June of I988, and above all the
Ouvea affair, were a salutary shock. They discredited the combative pol-
icy of the Chirac government, demonstrating the necessity for a concilia-
tory, even-handed approach that would redress the legitimate grievances
of the Kanaks. Against this background, the Rocard government has
secured broad acceptance in France of both the Matignon Accord and its
policy for New Caledonia. Both Chirac and Bernard Pons (Chirac's minis-
ter for Overseas Departments and Territories) at first supported the new
approach, although they later qualified their stance. Their Rassemble-
ment Pour la Republique (RPR Rally for the Republic) party called on its
supporters to abstain from voting in the November referendum, even
though the RPR'S ally in New Caledonia, the RPCR, was supporting a yes
vote. This policy, which took advantage of voter weariness after six pre-
vious polls from May to November I988, contributed to the low overall
participation rate.
Despite this hedging, Rocard's achievement has been striking, although
it may not prove enduring: previously the handling of New Caledonia had
been a party political issue in France, with the adversaries more interested
in scoring points than in comprehending the New Caledonian problem or
contributing to its resolution (Satineau I987). Rocard's government will
.. •
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maintain its pragmatic middle-of-the road approach, both for philosophi-
cal reasons and because the success of its New Caledonian policy depends
on its broad acceptance in both France and New Caledonia. The Socialist
party, which supports Rocard's stance, encompasses various currents of
thinking, but, while in office from 1981 to 1986, its center of gravity
shifted right, with pragmatic political concerns taking precedence over
grand principle (Mazey and Newman 1987). Meanwhile President Fran-
s;ois Mitterrand's continued high standing depends on his maintaining a
moderate stance. He would regard progress toward a lasting compromise
in New Caledonia, based on a broad consensus, as an important achieve-
ment of his second term in office.
"Decolonisation within the framework of French institutions" was how
Rocard presented his government's program during his August visit to
New Caledonia (Walls 1988c), a message apparently intended to reassure
the independence movement that independence was really on its way. But
in early July, Rocard stated that his personal hope was that in 1998 the
Kanaks would vote to stay French (SMH, 30 July 1988). Meanwhile the
French high commissioner has said that in 1998 "all formulas will be open"
for New Caledonia's constitutional future (Grasset 1988). French officials
argue that focusing on probable voting strengths some years hence is rais-
ing a false issue, because an outcome of 50 percent plus one for a particu-
lar solution, with the rest of the voters bitterly opposed, would not permit
an enduring, peaceful resolution. They argue that France's main task in
New Caledonia is to help develop a broad consensus on the territory's
future, no matter what the nature of that future.
FLNKS leaders are guardedly confident that a form of independence will
result from the Rocard plan. They argue that in any case, in the absence of
other realistic options, going along with the plan will bring benefits to the
Kanak community and permit the nationalist movement to work con-
structively toward independence. Some officials and commentators see
independence as inevitable in the longer term, whether achieved peace-
fully through the present plan, or more abruptly after further disruption
and violence.
Other outcomes remain possible. In discussion in August 1988, a senior
French official raised the example of the French Indian Ocean island of
Reunion. He said continued integration with France had become widely
accepted there since a push for independence led by the Reunion Commu-
nist party some years ago had lost momentum, and suggested that some-
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thing similar could happen in New Caledonia. Meanwhile, scholars work-
ing on France's overseas possessions have suggested that New Caledonia
(and French Polynesia) could follow the pattern of the other overseas pos-
sessions, with autonomist and pro-independence pressures being checked
by increased funding and open access to France for work and education
(Aldrich and Connell n.d.). However, opportunities in France are fewer
than previously, and travel costs from the Pacific are higher than from the
other overseas possessions. More important, the indigenous ethnic groups
in both New Caledonia and French Polynesia have a clear sense of identity
as a basis for nationalist aspirations, compared with the ethnically diverse
populations, in some instances entirely immigrant in origin, in the other
posseSSIOns.
The loyalists regard a partition of the territory as a "safety-hatch," to
quote a prominent loyalist, should the Rocard plan and the resulting refer-
endum fail to work out to their satisfaction. The no vote in the southern
electoral division in the November 1988 referendum showed the strength
of loyalist reservations about coming to terms with the Kanaks. Various
possible solutions have been discussed, ranging from giving Noumea a
special status akin to that of Hong Kong, to keeping the rich southern
province French while permitting the rest to become independent (see,
e.g., Groupe 1987). Partition has some precedents in the history of French
decolonization: Mayotte remained part of France when the Comores
became independent, and local French officials tried to separate Espiritu
Santo and Tanna from the rest of Vanuatu in 1979-1980 (Beasant 1984).
The partition of New Caledonia could be supported by a French govern-
ment under certain circumstances, although it is clear that dividing a sin-
gle main island, even in a relatively sparsely populated territory, is less
practicable than separating one island from others in a group. Assuming
that the nationalist movement would contest a partition, the French elec-
torate could tire of costs and trouble in a tiny territory on the opposite side
of the world. The rescue of the Ouvea hostages, which Chirac ordered a
couple of days before the final round of the presidential elections, did little
to assist his efforts to defeat Mitterrand, and may have harmed them.
Well-informed French contacts said in July-August 1988 that if present
efforts to achieve a lasting consensus aborted, then any French govern-
ment, whether right or left, could well seek to resolve the matter summar-
ily by granting a form of independence endorsed by a national referen-
dum. One added that this approach would be similar to that finally
adopted-by a rightwing French government-for Algeria.
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Although partition or other scenarios remain possible, prospects are
fair for at least some months of peace, during which the peoples of New
Caledonia can seek to work out their future together. Resentment and bit-
terness run deep; nationalist and loyalist perceptions of where the plan
should lead are contradictory; minor incidents have continued to take
place; a majority of loyalists and many nationalists have reservations
about the plan; and an ongoing threat to peace and cooperation is posed
by extremists on both sides. At any time, as a result of one or two inci-
dents, the situation could deteriorate rapidly. However, most people on
both sides would prefer to avoid further violence and would like to reach
an enduring consensus. The new French government has so far been suc-
cessful in obtaining the cooperation of the leadership of both blocs and an
overall majority of the population of the territory. The settlement nego-
tiated by Rocard will face several hurdles, beginning with the elections to
the new provinces in I989, and may not run its full course of ten years, but
should provide a breathing space.
FRENCH POLYNESIA:
TROUBLES AHEAD IN THE NUCLEAR TERRITORY?
Despite the deep divisions in New Caledonia, several French officials and
academics have suggested in recent discussions that French Polynesia
could present France with more problems over the next few years. As well
as having at least fair prospects for an enduring political settlement, New
Caledonia has some economic potential based on nickel and other miner-
als, agriculture and grazing, and tourism. French Polynesia, in contrast,
has a chronically dependent economy, meager economic potential, and
severe social problems.
The economy of the territory has been skewed by the impact of the
establishment of the nuclear testing sites on the outlying atolls of Moruroa
and Fangataufa, along with a support base on Hao Atoll and headquar-
ters and support facilities in Papeete, the capital of the territory. In addi-
tion to spending associated with the testing program, France has injected
extra funds to encourage local acceptance. France spends nearly A$IOOO
million on the territory-more than twice as much as it spends on New
Caledonia-although French Polynesia's population is only slightly larger
(see Table I). Most of the extra spending is linked directly or indirectly to
the testing program. French Polynesia lacks the resources and potential to
cover the costs of its present services and infrastructure, or to sustain
, ,
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present standards of living. Seabed mining could one day bring in good
returns, but won't be feasible until early next century, if then, and would
require massive investment. The territory's per capita gross domestic
product is higher than New Zealand's, and much higher than that of its
independent Pacific Island neighbors, but the high average obscures sharp
internal inequalities (Leontieff I987; Assemblee Nationale I987a; Shine-
berg I986; Greilsamer I987).
Before testing began, French Polynesia could hope to balance its trade
and budget and was not heavily dependent on metropolitan France. In
I96I, exports covered 70 percent of the cost of imports, but by the early
I970S this ratio had slumped to around IO percent, and has been even
lower since (Leontieff I987, 3-4). The spending associated with the testing
program also accelerated the already strong trend, found elsewhere in the
region, for people from the poor, isolated outer islands to migrate to the
capital, Papeete. Although the trend slowed in the I980s, over 70 percent
of the territory's population now lives on Tahiti, whereas only 50 percent
lived there in I95I (Deschamps and Guiart I957, 5I-52; Shineberg I986,
I57-I58). Compared with neighboring Polynesian countries, French Poly-
nesia has grave social problems: slum areas fringe Papeete, and prostitu-
tion and petty crime are prevalent. Sharp inequalities in the distribution of
wealth are evident, and, as in other South Pacific countries, unemploy-
ment rates are high, with poor employment prospects for young people.
The tensions in French Polynesian society were reflected in both the hotel
strike and riots of late I983 and the rioting of October I987. The latter,
which left central Papeete looking like a war zone, began when paramili-
tary police set out to disperse a dock workers' picket line. The incident fol-
lowed several months of industrial trouble over plans to reduce, as an
economy measure, the number of local jobs associated with the testing
program. The striking workers were supported by unemployed youths in
a battle with police, and then the disturbances spread through the town
(Realites, Nov-Dec I987; PIM, Dec I987, II).
Despite these problems, the French position remains strong. France
contained autonomist and pro-independence pressures in the I940S and
I950S, in part by dubious means, and in the I958 referendum over 64 per-
cent of the participants voted for the territory to remain part of the French
Republic. Special programs, initiated in response to the I987 rioting, are
providing extra jobs and some cheap housing, and France plans further
measures to alleviate social problems. Polynesian traditions and language
remain firmly rooted, and many French Polynesians regard their pride in
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their heritage as compatible with close connections between the territory
and France. Extensive ethnic intermixing has taken place, many French
settlers have Polynesian wives, and an elite of part-Polynesians-"demis"
-are prominent in business, politics, and administration. The more
full-blooded Polynesians, who constitute more than two-thirds of the pop-
ulation, are reasonably well represented in politics and hold some middle-
ranking administrative and managerial positions. The notion of Polyne-
sian identity is generally inclusive of all those with some Polynesian
ancestry, and sharp political or cultural discontinuities are mostly lacking.
Only some 15 to 20 percent of the electorate has voted for parties that
unequivocally support independence and oppose nuclear testing, and only
four of the forty-one members of the Territorial Assembly take a clear
antinuclear and pro-independence stance. However, concern over testing
is more widespread, and the Protestant church, to which 55 percent of the
population belongs, is strongly opposed. The majority of Polynesians are
aware that additional funds flow to the territory as a result of the testing
program, and many accept the argument that only French spending has
permitted Tahiti's infrastructure and services to attain a higher standard
than those of neighboring independent states. Moreover the Leontieff
government, which came to power in November 1987, generally takes a
cautious stance. The government represents a spectrum of parties united
mainly by their wish for power, by personal associations that cut across
party divisions, and by their dislike of Gaston Flosse, formerly the domi-
nant figure in the territory's politics. The government's minority of more
radical supporters of independence feel obliged to tread carefully in order
to have some influence from the inside. The government supports the
"Leontieff Plan" of late 1987, which calls on France to invest more funds to
improve French Polynesia's economic self-reliance, in a long-term pro-
gram to prepare for when testing is wound down (Leontieff 1987). This
stance, while favoring the eventual cessation of testing, accepts that it will
continue for some time yet and assumes that a high level of French aid
should continue.
The change of government in France did not lessen France's commit-
ment to its testing program. French representatives have indicated that
testing will continue indefinitely, notwithstanding the Leontieff plan.
They continue to state that the tests are essential to French security and
involve no health or environmental risks. French prestige comes first. This
helps explain why Brice Lalonde, a former Greenpeace campaigner
against French atmospheric testing, and now France's minister for the
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environment, has said that the underground tests do not cause environ-
mental problems (SMH, 4 June 1988, 23; CT, 30 July 1988, 4).
Neither is progress, in superpower arms limitation likely to bring early
changes to French policy. On the contrary, France believes it should do
more to provide nuclear security for Western Europe, in view of reduced
American strength and what could be a lessened American commitment
(see SMH, 23 Dec 1987, 27 Feb 1988). France regards deterrence as the
"irreplacable guarantee of peace in Europe" (Rocard 1988, 66). Great
progress in superpower arms limitation would be required before France
would consider winding down its nuclear arsenal. Superpower agreement
on a comprehensive test ban would put pressure on France to suspend its
tests. But France has consistently argued that the possession of its own
deterrent, tested at its own sites, provides an essential independence from
the superpowers, along with the ultimate guarantee of French security.
France could possibly even continue its underground tests, despite a
superpower test ban. Earlier, despite a superpower agreement to stop, it
continued atmospheric testing until faced with a definitive prohibition
order from the International Court of Justice (Booker 1987). Unless the
superpowers conclude the difficult task of negotiating a comprehensive
test ban, and maybe even then, France is likely to continue testing, while
ignoring suggestions that the tests be shifted to metropolitan France or to
Nevada in the United States.
Despite the testing, French Polynesia and especially Tahiti retain an
idyllic image in the popular mind. But French observers are concerned by
the potential for heightened racial tensions in a society formerly presented
as a model of pluriethnic harmony, notwithstanding underlying tensions.
They are equally apprehensive about the potential for increased strikes,
riots, disturbances, gang violence, and crime, and possibly also for vio-
lence by some of the tiny but ultramilitant radical parties that operate on
the fringe of the political system. They lack the confidence that France can
do more than merely alleviate some of the symptoms of the underlying
problems.
In the longer term, French Polynesia's social and economic problems
could strengthen antitesting and pro-independence pressure (O'Callaghan
1988). Whereas in New Caledonia, France has a political ballast in the
form of a majority settler population, such a ballast does not exist in
French Polynesia, where ethnic Polynesians form the majority. The Poly-
nesians are also economically disadvantaged, relative to the European,
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Chinese, and mixed-race segments of the population. Accordingly the
nationalist movement, which already has a sound base and some capable
leaders, could grow rapidly in strength in certain circumstances. How-
ever, the Rocard government could go some way in response to demands
for greater autonomy or independence, while maintaining a strong com-
mitment to the testing program. During the mid-I98os the then president
of the territory, Gaston Flosse, suggested on several occasions that French
Polynesia's constitutional status should become like that of the Cook
Islands, which is a sovereign state in free association with New Zealand.
A possible longer-term outcome would be a form of independence-in-
association, similar to that proposed for New Caledonia by the Fabius
government in early I98S, that would permit continued testing after "inde-
pendence" in return for a guarantee of continued massive funding. Such
an arrangement could be facilitated because in I964 the territorial govern-
ment ceded possession of the testing sites to the French state (Depeche, 27
June I986, I9-20; PIM, March I964, I8).
WALLIS AND FUTUNA: THE CINDERELLA TERRITORY
France's other possession in the Polynesian cultural region is the small ter-
ritory of Wallis and Futuna, which lies in the central South Pacific about
an hour's flight northeast of Fiji. Regional attention has been directed to
Wallis and Futuna only briefly in recent years, during the short-lived state
of emergency declared in late I986. The incident was an overreaction,
characteristic of the Chirac era, to a conflict between the French state,
anxious to uphold its authority, and the traditional "customary" authori-
ties on Wallis, who wanted the second-ranking French official in the terri-
tory expelled. The official in question, a highly-strung, difficult man, had
not adjusted to the pressures of small island life and had offended Walli-
sian sensitivities by his abrasive style and comments. To uphold its power,
France flew in thirty paramilitary police from Noumea, but no incidents
took place and the police left within twenty-six hours. After talks, and a
visit by Bernard Pons, the minister for Overseas Departments and Territo-
ries, tensions decreased, and the controversial official departed a few
weeks later, although some bitterness persisted (Nouvelles, IS Dec
I986 ,4S)'
French officials shrug off this incident as a storm in a cup of cafe au fait,
but it illustrated the continuing uneasiness between the French administra-
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tion and the local "customary" authorities. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the Catholic church ran Wallis and Futuna as a virtual
theocracy, with the assent of the traditional "monarchs" and "chiefs,"
although the islands were nominally a French protectorate. Later on, the
French resident commissioners strengthened their authority, and Wallis
and Futuna became a French territory in 1959, following an overwhelming
vote for this status in the September 1958 referendum. The French admin-
istration, advised by the Territorial Assembly, has exercised formal con-
trol since then, although the informal influence of both the church and the
chiefs and elders remains strong.
The two inhabited islands of Wallis and Futuna depend completely on
France for modern infrastructure and services. As well as some small
islands fringing the lagoon of Wallis, a third large island, Alofi, lies to the
southeast of Futuna, but is not permanently inhabited because it lacks a
water supply. Apart from a few dozen tonnes per year of trochus shell, the
territory's main export has been its people. The resident population is
13,500, but more Wallisians now live elsewhere. About 800 live in France,
IOOO in Fiji, and some 13,000 in New Caledonia. Only 900 members of
the territory's workforce earn salaries or wages, mostly in the administra-
tion or in public works, with the remainder engaged in subsistence fishing
and agriculture. This economic dualism between the subsistence and mon-
etized sectors is characteristic of all three French territories (and their
Pacific Island neighbors), but is especially marked in Wallis and Futuna.
Remittances from relatives overseas, especially those in New Caledonia,
contribute to fair living standards (Rensch 1983; W & F Interviews 1988).
After years of neglect, France began spending substantial funds in the
territory early in the 1980s (AssembIee Nationale 1987a, 45-49; 1987b, 29-
31). The years from 1983 to 1988 were marked by the construction of more
and better roads, the expansion of electrification, the growth of the school
system, and a sharp upturn in students completing secondary education
(W & F Interviews 1988; personal observations). Potential exists for the
export of small quantities of timber and for small-scale commercial deep-
sea fishing. Tourism is unlikely to develop much because of high costs and
social conservatism. French development advisers and technicians are
seeking to improve traditional methods of fishing and agriculture to
ensure that the booming population can be fed (Nouvelles, 14 March
1988, 30). Church and traditional influences contribute to a high birth
rate, and the average family has eight children.
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The people of the territory are almost one hundred percent Roman
Catholic, with 70 to 80 percent of them regular churchgoers; they are
strongly conservative. Personal rivalries and demands for further develop-
ment spending in particular localities form the substance of Wallisian poli-
tics, but the local parties are associated with the parties of the right and
the center-right in France. The left is all but nonexistent: the Socialist can-
didate gained less than 4 percent of the vote in the first round of the June
1988 National Assembly elections, while in the second round Brial (of the
right-wing RPR) won with 52 percent of the vote against Gata (of the cen-
ter-right UDF) with 48 percent.
The politicians of Wallis and Futuna regard independence as unviable
and instead see the territory evolving gradually to greater local autonomy,
while remaining firmly within the French state. Their nightmare is that
conflict in New Caledonia could lead to the return of large numbers of
their compatriots, which would pose big land, economic, and cultural
problems. They already have an inkling of what could be involved, fol-
lowing the return of some Wallisians from Vanuatu since independence
there. With new generations of high-schoolleavers finding almost no job
opportunities within Wallis and Futuna, continued out-migration is likely,
along with sharpening criticism of France's stewardship and calls for
increased spending. Yet, not least because its options are so limited, Wallis
and Futuna is likely to remain a loyal French overseas possession indefi-
nitely.
FRENCH DIPLOMACY IN THE CENTRAL SOUTH PACIFIC
France's image and prestige in the South Pacific suffered in the mid-1980s
from continued concern over nuclear testing, from the bitter conflict in
New Caledonia, and from the revelation that French agents had been
responsible for bombing the Rainbow Warrior. President Mitterrand dis-
tanced himself from the Rainbow Warrior affair, but also visited the
Moruroa testing site in late 1985 to reaffirm France's commitment to its
testing program (Firth 1987, 89; Le Monde, 19 Sept 1986; Age, 22 Sept
1986). On his return, he made a commitment to increased French spending
and diplomatic activity in the region and breathed new life into the mori-
bund proposal for a French university in the Pacific (French Embassy
1986). As well as having a Pacific context, these initiatives reflected a
renewed commitment by France, evident from the early 1980s, to assert its
... '
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presence and expand its influence throughout the developing world, both
in its own possessions and with independent countries (Levy 1987; PIM,
Sept 1984; Le Monde, 19 Sept 1986; Rocard 1988, 65-66). France faces
constraints of finances and resources, but increased aid spending on the
South Pacific has been at levels acceptable to the French public, and has
attracted no criticism in parliament or press. An estimated A$25-30 mil-
lion (c. US$20-24 m) per year has been required for France's new aid ini-
tiatives in the South Pacific, a modest amount compared with the sum of
over A$1450 million that France already spends on its own Pacific territo-
ries (Table I). The central importance to France of its nuclear testing pro-
gram has encouraged a readiness to invest resources to help allay criti-
cism. The heightened French commitment was highlighted by the 1987
decision to open a consulate-general in Honolulu, with accreditation to
the American Micronesian entities, even though several similar posts had
been closed down elsewhere, as an economy measure, in the preceding
few years (Letter, Nov 1987,7). The mission would be able to pursue links
with the American Micronesian entities, which were becoming eligible for
membership in the South Pacific Forum, and to liaise, stressing common
French and American interests, with the Honolulu-based headquarters of
the United States Pacific Command.
Mitterrand's approach was endorsed and pursued by the Chirac gov-
ernment, which won power in March 1986. In addition the Chirac govern-
ment strongly criticized Australian policies, under the misapprehension
that Australia was behind regional criticisms of France. France suffered
two diplomatic reversals in late 1986: At the behest of the South Pacific
Forum, the United Nations Committee of twenty-four on Decolonization
reinscribed New Caledonia on its list of colonial territories subject to
United Nations review. In addition, by the end of the year most South
Pacific countries had ratified the Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), which among other things opposed nuclear
testing in the region. These diplomatic initiatives raised the international
profile of the Forum countries and confirmed that they had some capacity
to put diplomatic pressure on France. French commentators tended to
belittle the influence of the South Pacific Forum. However, the validity of
their assessment was belied by the money and effort that the Chirac gov-
ernment devoted to seeking to head off criticism at the United Nations in
1986 and 1987. Moreover, the diplomatic reverses suffered over the treaty
and New Caledonia confirmed the view of the French government that
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France should do more to seek to allay Islander concerns and to improve
its image.
Despite France's reverses in I986, French efforts began to yield some
results in Fiji and Polynesia, and to some extent in Micronesia, in I987,
although in Melanesia they were mostly abortive. French diplomacy cen-
tered on Gaston Flosse, president of French Polynesia until February I987.
In early I986, Chirac appointed the energetic, urbane Flosse as secretary
of state (i.e., a junior minister) for the South Pacific and gave him a special
grant, known as the "Flosse fund," of about US$4 million to offer as aid,
along with the authority to commit larger amounts through normal chan-
nels (Assemblee Nationale I987a; Rothwell I987; Danielsson and Daniels-
son I987). Flosse played on his part-Polynesian ancestry to project himself
and French interests in a series of visits to South Pacific countries and
entities, addressing Polynesian audiences in Tahitian and making a favor-
able impression on speakers of the other Polynesian tongues. He also gave
strong support to the proposal that the Polynesian countries and entities
form a Polynesian "community" or confederation, which the French gov-
ernment presumably saw as a potential counterweight to the Melanesian
Spearhead bloc in the South Pacific Forum (NZH, 23 Jan I988; Letter,
Nov I987, 5; Robie I988).
French diplomats were bemused by Flosse's flamboyance and shuttle
diplomacy, but conceded that he had considerable impact. One of his
advisers recalled that after the Rainbow Warrior bombing, France's stand-
ing had been at the nadir, but that thanks to Flosse it had recovered
greatly (Brot I988). Some of the bilateral projects negotiated directly by
Flosse were funded through French Polynesia, while other funds were
channeled through the French embassies in Suva and Wellington. The aid
included a soft loan of A$IO million to the Cook Islands for cyclone recon-
struction (Dominion, 22 Feb I987), agreed on in August-September I987,
but was mostly on a smaller scale. In Western Samoa, France funded sev-
eral projects during I987, including a surgical theater, schools, upgrading
airstrips, and renovating the residence of the head of state (AAP I987). The
aid and associated spending covered a wide range of activities (see Appen-
dix). Direct French aid to Fiji, Polynesia, and Micronesia was a new initia-
tive, although France previously had contributed indirectly to some of
these countries via European Community grants. In Melanesia, as dis-
cussed later, France gave Vanuatu, formerly the Anglo-French Condomin-
ium of the New Hebrides, some A$8 million per year in bilateral aid prior
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to the breakdown in relations in late I987. Gaston Flosse lost his position
as secretary of state following the fall of the Chirac government in May
I988 and lost his seat in the French Parliament in the June I988 elections.
Earlier he had been displaced as president of French Polynesia. His pros-
pects are clouded, with cases involving claims of malpractice and corrup-
tion before the courts. The decline in his political fortunes may have
resulted in part from his absences from Tahiti while fulfilling his ministe-
rial role. However, the Rocard government has continued efforts to win
friends in the central South Pacific, if in a more low-key way and by more
routine diplomatic means.
In I988-I989, France is to fund community halls and water cisterns in
several villages, as well as a small freezer plant to assist the domestic fish-
ing industry in the traditional monarchy of Tonga. France will also spend
around A$2 million to build a stadium in Tonga for the I989 South Pacific
games, which should help France win friends in both Tonga and the wider
region (Josephe I988a, I988b). France has also offered specialized sports
coaching to island countries (AFP I988). In addition, the French govern-
ment is encouraging improved liaison and cooperation between French
research and scientific organizations and island governments and regional
organizations, and plans in due course to offer language and technical
training to Islander students at the French University of the Pacific, which
began operation in late I988. France has provided a sophisticated com-
puter center for the headquarters of the Committee for the Co-ordination
of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in South Pacific Offshore
Areas (ccOP/SOPAC), a regional organization based in Suva (Keith-Reid
I988). France has continued to be active in the South Pacific Commission,
not least by increasing its contributions, and has expanded its program of
naval visits to Fiji and the Polynesian countries (Letter, Nov I987; Jan
I988). France is encouraging French business and investment to move into
the anglophone Pacific, a trend facilitated by the tied character of French
aid. In Fiji, Renault is already well established; the Sofrana shipping line
has recently expanded its operation; and Air Pacific is purchasing two
ATR42 turbo-prop aircraft. The French government is sponsoring the
activities of the Alliance Fran~aise, which opened branches in Tonga in
I987 and Suva in late I988, the latter presided over by Filipe Bole, minister
for education (Josephe I988b).
Assisted by such initiatives, France has improved its image among poli-
ticians and officials in Fiji and the Polynesian countries. French standing
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has also benefited from the cultivation of personal contacts. Several Poly-
nesian leaders have accepted invitations to visit French Polynesia and
Moruroa or France in recent years. For example, visitors in late 1987
included senior government officials from the Cook Islands, Western
Samoa, American Samoa, and Tonga, as well as the Apia manager of the
Pacific Forum Line (Letter, Nov 1987). In 1987, not long after the first Fiji
coup, interim Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara was favorably
impressed when the French government turned what he had expected to
be a low-key visit to Paris into virtually a state visit, featuring meetings
with the prime minister and the president of France (FFA Interview 1988).
The benefits to France of its active diplomacy were illustrated in com-
ments made by Deputy Prime Minister Tupuola Efi of Western Samoa in
Auckland in late October 1987. After calling for a calm dialogue rather
than the maintenance of rhetorical positions on New Caledonia, he com-
mented that "the French, who have a Polynesian Minister, which in itself
is a considerable step ... are talking with states of the South Pacific out-
side their traditional sphere of influence, in a way they did not before. In
the Cook Islands and in other countries, they are offering their aid con-
structively." He added that differences over nuclear testing and other
issues remained, but that France, if it intended to playa more positive role
in the region, should be permitted to do so (Radio NZ interview, reported
in Letter, Nov 1987). In a similar vein, Le Tagaloa Pita, Western Samoa's
minister for economic affairs, told Parliament in December 1987 that
despite Western Samoa's strong opposition to French nuclear testing,
French aid should be accepted, that political issues should be separated
from economics and trade, and that as a developing country Western
Samoa needed all the assistance it could get (AAP 1987).
The countries of the central South Pacific have usually taken a moder-
ate stance on New Caledonia and testing. In Fiji, the Bavadra government
envisaged taking a different tack, but held office only briefly before being
deposed by the coup. The monarchy in Tonga has conservative views: for
example, Tonga refused to sign the Treaty of Rarotonga, taking its cue
from the Reagan administration, which opposed nuclear-free zones in
principle because of their potential to inhibit United States maritime
mobility. In the Cook Islands, attitudes are influenced by close kinship
and cultural ties with French Polynesia, and by some dissatisfaction over
New Zealand's policy on nuclear ship visits and its implications for the
ANZUS agreement (Short 1985).
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French diplomacy has been especially successful in Fiji. France "neither
condemned nor condoned" the 1987 coups (Josephe 1988b; see also John-
stone 1987). This stance was similar to that taken in francophone Africa
(Levy 1987), where, while pursuing diplomatic advantages, France has
turned a blind eye to human rights abuses and economic mismanagement
on a scale far worse than that in Fiji. The French government presumably
was aware that in terms of population Fiji is the second-largest South
Pacific state after Papua New Guinea, with an important role in regional
affairs because of its central location, its relative wealth and level of eco-
nomic development, and its cultural affinities with both Melanesia and
Polynesia. France took advantage of the uncertainties following the
coups, when Fiji's relations with traditional friends such as Australia and
New Zealand became frosty. The Fijian administration resented that
frostiness and was keen to accept French aid to offset the postcoup eco-
nomic downturn (FFA Interview 1988).
France also benefited from the ambivalence of regional responses.
Although the Forum country governments deplored the coup, most of
them took the view that Fiji should not be subject to external pressures. In
several countries the coup was perceived-and attracted sympathy-as a
reassertion of indigenous rights and interests. A prominent Papua New
Guinea official named his newborn son after coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka.
To a considerable extent this reassertion was regarded as taking prece-
dence over democratic principle and the rights of nationals from immi-
grant stock.
As well as profiting from the coups, French initiatives in Fiji benefited
from Fiji's long-term association with France in the negotiation of the
Lome Convention, which gives Fiji, as part of a grouping of African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries, privileged access and prices for sugar, its
major export to the European Community market. Ratu Mara has
impressed French officials and played a key role in the regular Lome nego-
tiations. Receptiveness to French initiatives had also been increased by
French-Fijian cooperation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(FFA Interview 1988).
The Rocard government has gone ahead with the implementation of a
A$16-million (c. us$I2.8m) aid package to Fiji, agreed in early 1988 on the
basis of groundwork laid by Flosse. The package consists of A$8.6 million
in loan funds, half in a soft loan and half at commercial but low rates,
along with a grant of A$8 million (c. us$6.4m). The loan money is to be
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spent on equipment, technical assistance, and training for civil aviation,
the sugar industry, and rural telecommunications, while the grant is to
buy 53 Renault Mack-type trucks, one small helicopter, and civil emer-
gency equipment. All purchases will be from French suppliers (Josephe
1988b). The infrastructure and equipment are said to be primarily for civil
use, but presumably could be used by the military under certain circum-
stances. The civil-military distinction will remain blurred while the army
remains a key political player.
The French aid initiative had immediate diplomatic repercussions,
assisting the Fiji administration in its efforts to gain acceptance. Until it
suspended aid in response to the coup, Australia was Fiji's most important
donor. Australia provided nearly A$9 million (c. US$7.2m) in 1983-84,
A$rr million (c. us$8.8m) in both 1984-85 and 1985-86, and was sched-
uled to provide A$14 million (c. us$rr.2m) in 1986-87 (AIDAB 1987). How-
ever, European Community and Japanese aid to Fiji had continued with-
out interruption. Shortly after the aid deal between France and Fiji was
announced, Australia decided henceforth to recognize states rather than
governments, a policy that had been pursued for several years by Britain,
France, the United States, and other countries. This change permitted the
recognition of Fiji and the reduction of diplomatic tensions. Australia
resumed providing aid, while keeping the defense cooperation program in
suspension, on the broad understanding that Fiji would be returning to
constitutional rule. Australia's policy shift was denounced by Dr Bavadra
(WA, 16-17 Jan and 13-14 Feb 1988; AFR, 19 Jan 1988, SMH, 30 Jan, 7
Sept 1988; CT, 25 Jan, I Feb 1988). The gratitude of the Fiji administration
toward France was shown in the following months: senior Fijian Foreign
Affairs officials believe that Fiji made an important contribution to
ensuring that the Forum submission on New Caledonia to the early.
August 1988 meeting of the UN Decolonization committee was moderate.
They also were pleased that the discussion of this issue permitted Fiji to
resume its position as a key member of the South Pacific Forum.
Fiji expects to maintain its positions on New Caledonia and testing, but
its stance is likely to reflect an effort to ensure that differences over New
Caledonia and testing do not conflict with good relations in other areas.
The Polynesian countries and entities are likely to take a similar line,
although Tonga could take a more conservative position. France's aid and
associated cultural policies traditionally have been mounted with a view
to the longer term: they set out to create local constituencies and to ensure
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that French views get a full hearing and some local support. France pre-
sumably would not expect to be able to "buy" the foreign policies of the
proudly independent Pacific Island states so as to bring about a complete
reversal of policies, but would hope to contain and mute criticisms.
France is attaining some success in achieving this objective, although
antinuclear sentiment in the South Pacific is strong, in part because of the
legacy in some areas of health and environmental damage as well as social
and cultural disruption from atmospheric testing. With church and trade
union support, the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement,
which takes an unqualified stance on nuclear issues, has helped keep criti-
cism of French testing high on the regional political agenda (Firth I987,
I33-I47). French representatives do not expect to reverse opposition to
testing, but have set out to allay concerns and to raise doubts about the
accuracy of antinuclear criticisms (Brot I988). Their efforts were assisted
to some extent by the report of the Australian, New Zealand, and Papua
New Guinea scientific mission, led by H. R. Atkinson, which visited the
test site in I983 (NZMFA I984). The mission concluded that underground
testing posed no health risks, but that leakage of radioactive materials
could occur after some hundreds of years. However, the scope and find-
ings of the mission have been questioned (Firth I987, I06-I07).
In the unlikely event that island leaders become fully reassured that
underground testing bears no health or environmental risks, many of
them would still argue that the tests should take place in France, not in an
overseas territory on the other side of the globe. For example, in his
address to the United Nations in October 1988, the Fiji representative
said, "if, as France maintains, the testing is safe and poses no danger to
human or marine life, then France should have no fears in conducting the
tests in their own backyard [sic]" (FT, I7 Oct I988). Despite continuing
differences, particularly over testing, the French diplomatic offensive
seems to be securing broader acceptance in the central South Pacific of
France's view that it has a legitimate role to play there and contributions
to make to the region's economic welfare, stability, and security.
In Melanesia, however, French diplomacy traditionally has had little
success. Melanesian leaders feel a strong sense of brotherhood with the
Kanaks of New Caledonia, and strongly oppose French nuclear testing. In
mid-I986 the three Melanesian countries formed the Melanesian Spear-
head group, to express Melanesian solidarity and to lobby for a strong
line on New Caledonia in the South Pacific Forum. Plosse's efforts to win
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favor in the Solomon Islands in 1986 backfired. When his promise of
cyclone reconstruction funds from the "Flosse fund" to the village of Prime
Minister Peter Kenilorea became known in late 1986, Kenilorea was
ousted from office. Kenilorea's colleagues had strong reservations about
accepting French aid, especially outside normal diplomatic channels and
for what seemed a self-interested project. However, the new Papua New
Guinea government, which assumed power in July 1988 with Michael
Somare as foreign minister, may be more reserved in its comments on
French policy than its predecessors. French relations with all three
Melanesian countries began to improve following the acceptance by the
FLNKS of an interim settlement in New Caledonia.
French relations with Vanuatu were soured by French obstruction of
independence and the support of local French officials for the Santo seces-
sion attempt in 1980 (Beasant 1984). Relations have been sporadically dif-
ficult throughout the 1980s, and deteriorated sharply in late 1987, when
the Vanuatu government stated that it had proof that France was funding
the opposition, francophone-based, Union of Moderate Parties (UMP)
(Age, 9 Oct 1987,6). Vanuatu expelled the French ambassador, France cut
its aid spending, Vanuatu expelled further diplomats, and France reduced
its aid even further. The size of the French mission shrank from over thirty
expatriate staff to only two, with the head of the mission not accorded
diplomatic status. The Vanuatu government contends, however, that
French language and culture will remain important in Vanuatu and that
educational and cultural bilingualism will persist (Natuman 1988), super-
imposed on the bedrock of traditional culture and the national language
of Bislama. A "normalization" of the relationship was delayed by a bitter
political conflict between the governing Vanua'aku Pati (vp), led by Father
Walter Lini, and an alliance between the UMP and a small, dissident group
of former VP legislators led by Barak Sope.
In late 1988, having consolidated its position, the Lini government set
out to reduce tensions with France, although Vanuatu remained critical of
French testing. But at the United Nations General Assembly in October,
Vanuatu commended France on reaching a settlement in New Caledonia,
and a few weeks later the Vanuatu foreign minister traveled to France for
talks (PR, 29 Sept 1988; CT, 31 Oct 1988, 8). Vanuatu needs French aid
money, and the Vanuatu government wanted to avoid the charge of being
anti-French in the December 1988 by-elections in order to reduce local
francophone opposition. Despite this "normalization," relations between
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France and Vanuatu under a vp government are likely to remain difficult.
On the other hand, if the UMP, perhaps allied with Sope's group, eventu-
ally gained power, then Vanuatu would have closer and more cordial rela-
tions with France, which would be a major breakthrough for France in the
Melanesian part of the Pacific.
Australia and New Zealand reserve the right to differ on particular
issues, but are likely to continue to seek constructive relations with
France, and have welcomed the fresh approach of the Rocard govern-
ment. On Australia's behalf, Foreign Minister Evans underlined this
stance during his successful mid-September visit to New Caledonia. As the
full integration of the European Community into a single market proceeds
during the early 1990S, EC market access, and France's influence on it, will
become an even more important consideration for Australia and, espe-
cially, New Zealand.
CONCLUSION: THE FRENCH PACIFIC INTO THE 1990S
France's presence in the South Pacific has remained strong, but has under-
gone some changes. Fully fledged colonialisffi_ came to an end in the
French Pacific during the first two decades after the Second World War.
Suffrage became universal, after several piecemeal advances. The people
of all three territories chose to remain with France in the 1958 referendum,
rejecting the bleak alternative of immediate, complete independence with
no further aid. Under the present French constitution, established in 1958,
independence is provided for in response to a majority vote of a territory's
inhabitants. France has granted the territories a modest degree of internal
autonomy, as well as the right to send representatives to the French Parlia-
ment. Yet politically, economically, socially, and psychologically, many
colonial characteristics have endured, especially in New Caledonia (Koh-
ler 1987a, 1987b; Spencer, Ward, and Connell 1987; see also Christnacht
1987). In French Polynesia, the establishment of the nuclear testing facili-
ties subordinated local to French national interests and greatly strength-
ened France's commitment to remaining. During the 1980s, chronic eco-
nomic difficulties and a rise in French spending increased the dependence
of the territories even further.
Although France's will to maintain sovereignty remains strong, the
trend over the next decade or so in the two larger territories of New Cale-
donia and French Polynesia seems to be toward some form of indepen-
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dence, whereas Wallis and Futuna is likely to remain politically integrated
with France. In New Caledonia, a form of independence could come
either through the Rocard plan, or, more traumatically, following re-
newed militant mobilization by the independence movement. Partition
also remains possible, if the rival blocs fail to find a way of working
together. A version of independence-in-association could be implemented
in French Polynesia, permitting continued testing in a neocolonial context
in which France would pay a large "rent" for the use of the testing facili-
ties. But whatever the final constitutional arrangements, France is likely to
maintain close links with, and strong influence over, the new states. As
with the francophone African states (Chipman 1985; Bernstein 1987), but
even more decisively because of the settler majority in New Caledonia, as
well as the small scale and the economic weakness of the French Pacific
territories, the longer-term transition is likely to be from colonialism to
neocolonialism. In some respects this dependence would resemble that of
most of the other island entities of the region (AIDAB 1987; Connell 1988),
except that it would be very heavily accentuated. If they attain a form of
independence, New Caledonia and French Polynesia could be comparable
to Belau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia,
where the former administering power has continued to provide massive
funding in return for political and strategic benefits.
By negotiating a settlement in New Caledonia, the new French govern-
ment has reduced tensions between France and the South Pacific Forum.
France also is profiting from the momentum of a diplomatic (including
aid) offensive, begun under Chirac and directed -especially at Fiji and the
other states and entities in the central South Pacific. Accordingly, despite
strong concern over nuclear testing, and doubts about whether the Rocard
plan will work, the French presence in the South Pacific seems likely to
attract less criticism in the early 1990S than it has during most of the
198os. Overall, there seems to be an increased readiness among the Forum
governments to accept the likelihood of a continuing French presence and
to believe that benefits could flow from that presence. The evolution in
regional attitudes was reflected during the late September 1988 meeting of
the South Pacific Forum, when a resolution commending the settlement in
New Caledonia complemented a condemnation of testing, as well as in the
overall tenor of comments by the representatives of Forum countries at the
October 1988 General Assembly of the United Nations.
Compared to the early 198os, there are now a greater number of press-
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ing issues that preoccupy, and at times divide, the countries of the region.
These issues include intractable problems of economic development, post-
coup circumstances in Fiji, political uncertainties in Vanuatu, the question
of how best to handle increased outside interest in the region, intermittent
Libyan and recurrent Soviet initiatives, and the potentially disastrous
impact of the "greenhouse effect." As a result, questions relating to the
French presence could attract less attention than previously. The new sali-
ence of other issues has made some island governments more receptive to
French presentations about the prospective aid and security benefits of an
enduring French presence.
Renewed unrest in New Caledonia or French Polynesia would embar-
rass France and strengthen regional concerns. Condemnation of nuclear
testing in French Polynesia will continue, although its intensity will vary
over time and from country to country. In 1975, France bowed to regional
diplomatic pressure, spearheaded by Australia and New Zealand, and
halted atmospheric testing, but nowadays is adamant that underground
testing is essential to French security and poses no health or environmental
risks. France seems likely to shrug off criticism and keep on testing for
some years, perhaps into the next century. Despite criticisms and difficul-
ties, and despite the changes in French attitudes and institutions flowing
from European economic integration around 1992, France can be expect-
ed to continue to uphold its presence in the South Pacific. At present the
Rocard government is succeeding in blunting criticism by taking some
account of Forum country concerns and by demonstrating that the French
presence can bring aid and other benefits. Yet because of the broad conti-
nuities in French objectives and policy, underlying tensions will surface
intermittently and will persist between France and the countries of the
regIOn.
THIS ARTICLE DRAWS in part on interviews and discussions held during a research
visit, funded by the Australian National University, to Vanuatu, New Caledonia,
Wallis and Futuna, and Fiji in July-August 1988. Although these exchanges have
been documented as fully as possible, some comments were not for direct attribu-
tion. Earlier versions of the article were presented at the Africa-Pacific Compara-
tive Conference at La Trobe University on 25 August 1988, and to a meeting of
the Canberra branch of the Australian Institute for International Affairs on 20
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September 1988. I benefited from the helpful comments of the participants, as
well as from those ofseveral colleagues and four anonymous editor's readers. For
invaluable research assistance, I would like to thank Linda Allen, Nicole Carew-
Reid, and Christine Wilson.
ApPENDIX







Two lecturers in French at
USP 1,140,000
Fellowships or training for
students 100,000
Three experts in various
fields 432,900
One lecturer in sciences 667,200
Fellowships in geology 35,000
Equipment and training 350,000
Two experts for cCOP /
SOPAC 850,000
Equipment and funds for
CCOP/SOPAC 660,000
Invitation cCOP / SOPAC 65,460
Books for schools and
libraries 15,000
1 in Vanuatu, 1 in Fiji
In-training courses (French)-
Noumea
2 marine biology, 1 electron-
ics for uSP
For USP center in Vanuatu
Student trips to New Caledo-
nia or Vanuatu
For or during experts' tours





Visit to France by director
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Two teachers of French
Two experts in agronomy




























1 expert and provision for
equipment





To France for Health perma-
nent secretary, for AIDS Con-
ference
By oceanic vessel Jean Char-
cot
2 teachers and equipment
1 in vanilla growing, 1 in
renewable energy, plus
expenses
Equipment for outer islands
Solar kits for refrigeration
Research by experts from
CNRS
(c. A$1.7 m or us$1.4 m)
Source: French Embassy, Suva.
Note: As of 16 September 1988 A$I was equal to approximately 5 French francs.
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1 The other possessions comprise the Territorial Collective of St Pierre and
Miquelon in the North Atlantic, the Departments of Guadeloupe and Martinique
in the West Indies, the Department of French Guiana (Guyana) in South America,
the Department of Reunion and the Territorial Collective of Mayotte in the
Indian Ocean, the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (including Kerguelen
Island) in the Antarctic, and Clipperton Island in the North Pacific, south of
Mexico.
2 Aldrich n.d.; Aldrich and Connell n.d.; FCJP 1987; Connell 1987; Dal-
ton 1981; Guillebard 1976; Herodote 1985; Montbrial et al 1987; Moutoussamy
1987.
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